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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J. W. BROADWATER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Case No. 15319 
GLEN VAN TASSELL, ERMA VAN 
TASSELL, his wife, and DICK 
'liu'1 TASSELL, 
Defendants. 
VAN TASSELL'S BRIEF ON REHEARING 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 11, 1977 a trial was held before the Honorable 
Duffy Palmer in Davis County concerning this action. On May 
16, 1977 the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment were entered. This appeal was taken from 
t~se Findings and Judgment. 
On September 30, 1977 Van Tassell filed his brief with 
this Court. On October 26, 1977 respondent filed his brief. 
~March 9, 1978 Van Tassell's reply brief was filed with this 
Court. Shortly thereafter, respondents filed a Motion to 
Strike the Reply Brief. 
On March 16, this matter was argued before this Court by 
\I.,.. 
1''-bb?ls and by Mr. Cook. .ll.t that time Mr. Tibbals renewed 
~a Strike the Reply Brief and a thorough discussion 
3
" to the ~ontent of the reply brief and its relation-
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ship with the arguments raised by Van Tassell. 
On April 12, 1978 this Court in a unanimous decision 
affirmed the lower court's findings but reversed as to the 
matter of attorney's fees. 
On May 1, 1978 respondent petitioned for a rehearing a:.: 
submitted his brief in support. On May 4 this Court grante: 
respondent's Petition for Rehearing and this matter is nowt;. 
fore this Court on rehearing. 
Since there is an absolute void in Utah case law conce::.· 
ing the procedure to be used during a rehearing, inquiries 
were made by both parties to this Court and its Clerk cancer.~. 
certain questions. Based upon these answers Van Tassell in: 
action assumes that he has now become the equivalent of a re:· 
pondent because it is Broadwater' s burden to show that the c:.· 
ginal decision was incorrect. However, to eliminate confus:::. 
as to the status of the parties no reference will be made ::. 
this brief to either appellants or respondents since the p:· 
ties are obviously different depending upon which stage of'.:.; 
proceeding is being discussed. 
Van Tassell also assumes that the only issue before t:::; 
Court is the propriety of its previous decision in stn~i:.; 
the attorney's fees from the judgment and that other rnai::e:: 
raised by Van Tassell in the previous nearing are not ar9".Ja:. 
in this proceeding. 
Van Tassell has taken this opportunity t2 
-2- d 
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'.llS understanding at this juncture for the benefit of Broad-
·,.;:icer and this Court so that a correction of these assumptions 
be made before oral ar<Ju_'llent if necessary. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING 
van Tassell seeks ratification of the previous decision 
reversing that part of the judgment relating to the awarding 
of $8,500 in attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BROADWATER WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW BY VAN TASSELL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO 
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE LOWER 
COURT. 
Broadwater in his rehearing petition makes the following 
statement: 
If the defendant's counsel did not con-
sider the record supported the finding of 
the court he was obliged under the exist-
ing precedent to make a timely objection 
to the court's action and thereby afford 
counsel the opportunity to present addi-
tional proof on that issue. (Rehearing 
Petition, p. 12). 
3roadwater further comments: 
~or counsel for the defendant to acquiesce 
in the action of the District Court in al-
lowing attorney's fees (R., p. 464; Tr., 
p. 191) and not timely raise any issue 
thereon when had the matter been raised 
it could have been forthwith corrected is 
~o permit the defendant to deprive the 
piaintiff of a valuable contract right by 
:up~j~~;. T~is is neither fair nor just. 
'?P:-. .o:ar'_-,c '°etition, p. 13). 
-3-
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These statements must be considered remarkable since th 
. ey 
seem to imply that Van Tassell was obligated to correct 
an:; 
errors made by Broadwater during the trial so that oroad·11 ,:,: 
would have an opportunity to sustain his burden. 
Broadwater in his "Respondent's Brief" admits that be 
appeal in this action is from a "trial". (Respondent's brie: 
p. 3) • Under Broadwater' s theory any party in a trial pre-
ceeding is obligated to inform the other party that he has 
failed to prove an essential part of his case so that the 
failing party has not been denied due process. 
Obviously, such an argument is absurd and Van Tassell;,;, 
perfectly justified in "remaining silent" as to the evide~c: 
relating to attorney's fees in the lower court since this ·m 
not a matter where formal objection was required. During ::: 
trial it would have been ridiculous for Van Tassell to ente: 
an objection that Broadwater had failed to put on evidence :: 
cerning the proof of attorney's fees. No such objection ex;: 
After the Findings of Fact were entered by the trial :: : 
Van Tassell had a choice of either bringing this failure tc: 
lower court's attention or taking it directly on appeal. ;,;: 
52 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifically pr:·:: 
Upon motion of a party made not later than 
ten days after entry of judgment the court 
may amend its findings or make additional 
findings and may amend the judgment accord-
ingly. The motion may be made wit~ a ~~­
tion for a new trial pursuant to Rul2 ),. 
When findings of fact are made and 3.Ctl'.JI~ 
-4-
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tried by the court without a jury, the ques-
tion of the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the findings may thereafter be 
raised whether or not the party raising the 
question has made in the District Court an 
objection to such findings or has made ei-
ther a motion to amend them, a motion for 
judgment, or a motion for a new trial. (Emphasis added). 
It was, therefore, completely discretionary upon Van Tassell 
whether to raise the sufficiency of the evidence concerning at-
torney's fees before the trial court. Broadwater's arguments 
tlat he has been denied "an opportunity" to argue this issue is 
without merit since under Utah Rules there is no automatic right 
that such issue be presented before the lower court. 
Broadwater during oral argument and in his Petition for a 
Rehearing blames Van Tassell for his own failure to produce evi-
dence as to the reasonable value of attorney's fees or to put a 
si..ipulation into the record that such evidence would not be ne-
cessary. He continually states that it was agreed by counsel 
md by the parties that such evidence would not be necessary. 
Van Tassell disputes this fact and states for the record that no 
such stipulation was ever entered into on behalf of Van Tassell. 
This Court in Watkins v. Simones, 385 P.2d 154 (Utah 1963) 
(cited by Broadwater in his Pe ti ti on for Rehearing, p. 9) stated 
triat a stipulation not in the record cannot be considered by 
t.'isi~ourt. This Court stated: 
~or is there any suggestion that the plain-
c~: ': s were in any way prevented from making 
anrl tL1nging to this Court any record they 
-5-
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have desired .•.. In any event, this Court 
cannot consider facts stated in the briefs 
which may be true but absent in the offi-
cial record. 
As stated by Justice Crockett in the original opinio:: 
this matter: 
This Court has consistently held that such 
an award (attorney's fees) just like any 
other aspect of a judgment, must have a foun-
dation in evidence and a finding based there-
on. Plaintiff fails to meet that burden. 
The opinion is supported by numerous authorities wh1c~ 
have held that it is the burden of the party seeking attom:' 
fees to affirmatively prove or to obtain stipulations as;::: 
reasonable value of such fees. In Brasher Motor and Finance 
Co. v. Anderson, 433 P. 2d 608 (Utah 1967) this Court stated 
the following: 
The Court awarded to the plaintiff attor-
ney's fees based upon the promises set forth 
in the notes issued by the corporate defen-
dant. It does not appear that there was evi-
dence to support the award of attorney's fees 
nor does it appear that the defendants agreed 
that the Court might fix the amount of such 
attorney's fees. In view of the prior deci-
sions of this Court it would appear that the 
granting of attorney's fees based upon the 
record in this case is error. Id at 609-6lO. 
In Butler v. Butler, 461 P.2d 727 (Utah 1969) thi 5 c:;:· 
stated that it has consistently held that an attorney's fee 
may not be awarded where there is nothing in the record tc ,_ 
tain the award either by way of evidence or by stipulat::: 
the parties as to how the court may fix it. 
-6-
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... 
Finally, in Financial Corporation v. Byld, 404 P.2d 670 
(Ctah 1965) this Court made the following pertinent statements: 
It is fundamental that the judgment must 
be based upon findings of fact, which in 
turn must be based upon the evidence. This 
rule has been followed by this Court and 
other jurisdictions in regard to awarding 
attorney's fees. Because both judges and 
lawyers have special knowledge as to the 
value of legal services, this is not always 
required to be proved by sworn testimony. 
It is sometimes submitted upon stipulation: 
as to amounts; or that the Judge may fix it 
on the basis of his own knowledge and ex-
perience; and/or in connection with refer-
ence to a Bar approved schedule. Any one 
of these would have provided an evidentiary 
basis for making the determination. How-
ever, it was an issue of fact which was 
denied. Thus it was part of the plaintiff's 
case to which it had the burden of proving. 
Failing to offer proof of any character on 
this issue had the same effect as would the 
failure to offer proof as to any other con-
troverted issue. There is nothing upon 
which to base a finding. The defendant's 
objections that the finding as to attorney's 
fees is not supported by any evidence is 
well-taken and the judgment must be correc-
ted in that particular. Id. at 673-674. 
The cases cited by Broadwater in his Petition for Rehear-
ing do not contradict these well-established Rules of Civil 
Procedure and eviden tiary requirements. In the Huber case and 
':he :lorth Salt Lake case (Broadwater's Petition for Rehearing, 
?· 4 i matters other than the sufficiency of evidence were being 
"t':acked ar1ct the c · h b 
· ourt correctly stated that ill sue cases o -
"Yll.2..St be raised in the lower court. 
Le t';e Pettingill case (Broadwater' s Petition 
-7-
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for Rehearing, p. 6) the issue there concerned · instruction: :. 
the jury which necessarily involved objections to the 
c0urt ai:. th.: llme they are made. ·rh· · · 1 s again is a far er;' :::· 
sufficiency of the evidence and from Rule 52(b) whi"ch 
. spec,. 
fically allows no objection to be made. 
The Blair Enterprise case (Broadwater' s Petition for ~e-
hearing, p. 8) states the rule concerning the necessity 0: 
proving attorney's fees and then states: 
The trial court made findings thereon 
based on evidence adduced, as stated in 
the judgment, and although the record 
fails to disclose the evidence, no objec-
tion was leveled against them, so we ac-
cept them as true taken under familiar 
rules of review. Id. at 1295. 
A footnote following the word "evidence" in this quotation;: 
the following, "No one designated it on appeal." Id. at,,:: 
In the Blair Enterprise case it is apparent that nor.2 c: 
the adverse parties objected to the reasonableness of tl",e ;:· .. 
ney' s fees at any stage in the appellate proceedings a:id ::.;: 
this Court therefore ruled that such objection had been-,:;.;·:;: 
Van Tassell argues, as will be stated later on in this t::e:, 
that the sufficiency of this fee was impliedly assigned as::: 
and that in any case it was brought to the court's a ttent;::. 
prior to the decision in this matter. 
The Johnson case (Broadwater' s Petition for Re'.-.eari:.: 
9) was a ~ontana case involving a countercla~~ 
-8-
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:ees and concerned the issue of whether any attorney's fee was 
legally reql:ired to be paid. In this case, however, there was 
Jo dispute that should Broadwater prevail in the action a rea-
sonable attorney's fee was legally required. It is interesting 
:c note that a prior Montana case cited in the Johnson decision 
asain reiterates the requirement of evidence as to the amount 
a::d sufficiency of the attorney's fee. The Montana Supreme 
Court in Crncevich v. Georgetown Recreation Corporation, 541 
P.2d 56 (Mont. 1975) stated the following: 
[I]n contested cases we are inclined to fol-
low those states requiring the introduction 
of proof from which a reasonable fee may be 
determined. To award a fee in such a case 
without proof would be to disregard the fun-
damental rules of evidence. An award of fees, 
like any other award, must be based on com-
petent evidence. Furthermore, the proper 
determination of a legal fee is central to 
the efficient administration of justice and 
the maintenance of public confidence in the 
Bench and Bar. Because of respondents' fail-
ure of proof the award of fees was properly 
denied. Id. at 59. 
Finally, the Gardner case cited by Broadwater (Petition for 
?ehearing, p. 9) concerns an award of $150 in a divorce action. 
There the court held that evidence as to a reasonable attorney's 
fee '.,·as not necessary when the court awarded "only a modest fee"· 
Certainly, it cannot be said that $8,500 fits into this "modest 
:ee" ;:ategor:;. 
3
r:ceidwa:"'-c's arguments throughout his Petition for Rehear-
- ~a~~er was qualified to evaluate a reasonable 
-9-
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attorney's fee are irrelevant. It was Broadwater's obligati 
to show in the record that a stipulation to that effect had 
been approved by Van Tassell and his failure to do so clea( 
precludes him from now relying upon Judge Palmer's expenen:' 
or knowledge of the case. 
In sununary, Broadwater does not have any due process r:: 
to correct errors committed by himself because Van Tassell :: .. 
ed to point out such errors at the time of trial or subsequ;:: 
At the conclusion of a trial, whether it be tried before t::e 
court or a jury, evidence must be sealed and laid to rest ~'-
less in those rare cases the trial court grants a new trial :0 
cause of newly discovered evidence or other extraordinary c::· 
cumstances. 
Broadwater is not entitled to now go back to the trial 
court and reopen the trial as to the issue of attorney's fee: 
any more than he would be entitled to reopen it as to the do.-
regarding the amounts of the notes themselves. 
For these reasons, Broadwater' s arguments that he was:.;: 
at the trial level are without merit and should be rejected: 
this Court. 
POINT II 
BROADWATER WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW ON APPEAL OF THIS CASE SINCF THE SUF-
FICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE REGARDING ATTOR-
NEY 1 S FEES WAS RAISED BY VAN TASSELL A.c~D . 
BROADWATER WAS GIVEN SUFFICIENT OPPuRTUNI'lr 
TO CHALLENGE THIS POINT AND WAS NOT PRE!T ~ 
DICED OR HARMED IN ANY WAY. 
-10-
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Broadwater in his Petition for Rehearing argues that the 
reply brief filed by Van Tassell contained new issues not be-
fore raised in appellant's main brief. (Petition for Rehear-
iDg, pp. 10-13). He further claims that such alleged raising 
of the issue violated his right to due process in that he was 
denied a hearing as to the problem of attorney's fees. 
such contention is without merit. Rule 75(d) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure states that no assignment of errors 
is necessary. Rule 75(p) (2) requires an appellant's brief to 
state the argument under separate headings insofar as such se-
paration is practicable. Van Tassell in his brief in chief 
under Point I stated, "The Court's Decision at Trial was not 
Supported by the Evidence Presented". This heading certainly 
was sufficient as an assignment of error to attack the suffi-
ciency of evidence relating to all the damages including attar-
ney' s fees. Questions on appeal concerning the sufficiency of 
evidence do not require the specifics of other is sues and can 
be plead more generally. 
L94 O} • 
Ronse v. Favre, 103 P.2d 26 (Colo. 
While admittedly Mr. Fullmer did not mention that portion 
of the court's decision concerning attorney's fees such omis-
sion is not fatal given the context of this case. The question 
11f - .;:; - . 
" ~u,ticier:c:/ of evidence concerning the attorney's fees is an 
Broadwater could not now complain of any 
-11-
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lack of due process or notice had Fullmer simply made llie 
statement, "There was insufficient evidence to support the 
award of dttorney's fees by the trial court." 
There is nothing else that Van Tassell could do in his 
main brief to bolster this statement since the absence of e·.· 
dence cannot be cited. As Justice Crockett stated in In Re 
Lavelle's Estate, 248 P.2d 372 (Utah 1952): 
The sketchiness of appellant's brief in 
this regard is excused in some degree by 
the difficulties inherent in attempting to 
point out specifically wherein there is 
"no evidence" to support a given finding. 
An appellant cannot be asked to go through 
the transcript, showing how the testimony 
reported on each page does not support the 
finding. Yet, insofar as it is practica-
ble, he must detail, with citations to the 
record where appropriate, the particulars 
wherein the evidence touching the finding 
is inconsistent therewith or is not of 
enough moment to sustain it. Id. at 375. 
Since there was no evidence of a stipulation or evide":' 
as to the reasonable value of the attorney's fees in the rec: 
Van Tassell could do no more than to make this simple state· 
ment. While he neglected to do so specifically in the maiJ 
brief he stated the following in the reply brief: 
The record is absolutely void of any evidence 
presented by plaintiff concerning reasonable 
d of attorney's fees. The record is also voi 
any stipulation or agreement allowing the , 
court to make this conclusion based upon tne 
court's own knowledge. The absence of any .... 
evidence to substantiate these attor:-ie;·' 5 r~" 0 
requires a modification of the ;udgment •7:ic:c· 
1 sr1"'f c. ting this amount. Van Tassell Rep Y ~ ' ' 
8. 
-12-
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Hr. Tibbals during the oral argument admitted that there 
nothing in the record showing a stipulation as to the rea-
scnaolc:ne:ss of dt-corncy 1 s fees or evidence proving this fact. 
Broadwater has cited no evidence in his Petition for Rehear-
ing to the contrary. Thus, Broadwater can show no prejudice 
by the fact that the statement as to attorney's fees was not 
specifically mentioned until the reply brief even though the 
question as to sufficiency of evidence had been generally raised 
in the main brief. 
Broadwater argues he had no opportunity to refute the at-
torney' s fee question raised in the reply brief but can offer 
no refutation on the merits. Broadwater is attempting to util-
ize the general appellate procedural rule concerning briefing 
to eliminate a legitimate question before this Court which was 
:ienerally raised in the appellant's brief and in which no show-
ing of prejudice has resulted. Broadwater had sufficient op-
portunity to cite any evidence to the contrary at the oral ar-
gument and was totally unable to do so just as he would have 
been unable to do so · h d 1 b · f in t e respon ent s rie • 
Even if it were conceded that the appellant's brief did 
not pronerlv- ra; "e th · f ff· · f · d ~ - ~- e question o su iciency o evi ence, 
cc•Jrts in numerous jurisdictions have held that an appellate 
'
1
'--°·'."retion to overlook procedural infirmities in ap-
:3 .:.u,=Jtions. 
~n Yc~ '' Kingsbury, 379 p. 2d 893 (Ariz. 1963) the 
-13-
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defendant argued that the assignment of errors prepared by : 
appellant was wholly inadequate because it did not distinct 
specify each ground of error relied upon as re · d quire by c:" 
rules. The Supreme Court of Arizona stated the following: 
Strictly speaking we are of the opinion 
that defendants' contention has merit. 
But these assignments of error, though 
poorly drawn, may be taken as an attempt 
to urge the insufficiency of the evidence 
to sustain the "Findings of Fact and 
Judgments". Therefore, we will consider 
plaintiff's assignments as sufficient to 
present this issue to the Court, even 
though it will require a great deal more 
time and effort to search out the grounds 
relied upon and the evidence relating 
thereto. Id. at 894. 
The Supreme Court of New Mexico in Henderson v. Texas:;, 
Mexico Pipeline Company, 131 P.2d 269 (N.M. 1942) was faced 
with a similar argument that the procedural rules of the cou:· 
had been violated. That court stated the following: 
It has been suggested also, by appellee, 
that Section 6 of Rule XV, Supreme Court 
Rules, has been violated by appellant in 
that he failed to set out and state in his 
brief the substance of all evidence bearing 
upon the proposition, with proper references 
to the transcript, in support of his conten-
tion that the Findings of Fact are not sup-
ported by substantial evidence. It is true 
that appellant has not observed the rule, 
exactly, in this respect. He does not set 
out the substance of all evidence, bearing 
upon the proposition, although it might be 
said that he has omi~~ed none of it favor-
able to his position. . . We cannot say cha" 
appellant's challenge to the evidence shCU'
1 
under the particular circumstances, be Vi, 
nored, although a strict adherence to the 
-14-
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rule might so require. Yet, because of 
the simplicity of the question at issue, 
and its importance to the parties, we pass 
the question of rule violation, if it be 
that in fact, to consider the case upon 
its merits. Id. at 271-272. (Emphasis 
added). 
The Supreme Court of Colorado in Neilson v. Bowles, 236 P.2d 
286 (1955) stated that the court on its own motion may consider 
errors not raised by either party if such consideration is ne-
cessary to do justice. Likewise, the Supreme Court of Alaska in 
'lorthern Corporation v. Chugach Electric Association, 52 3 P. 2d 
1243 (Ala. 1974) stated: "We are always concerned with notions 
of equity and fairness, regardless of whether they are presented 
to us in argument." Id. at 1245. Also, the Supreme Court of 
Oregon in State v. Hodes noted that the Supreme Court had dis-
cretionary power to notice errors even though not assigned if 
such examination would be in the interest of justice. 
Finally, in Bardeen v. Cornrnader Oil Company, 119 P.2d 967 
(Ct. App. Cal. 1941) the California appellate court held that a 
reviewing court is always at liberty to decide the case upon 
any point which proper disposition may seem to require, whether 
brought to the court's attention by counsel in the reply brief 
for the first time or not. 
rflt, . 
""us it can be easily seen from the preceding cases that 
'-::re~cn.2 ('·:'tir~s of numerous states do not strictly adhere 
oroc~dural rules in cases where such procedure would 
- ''-J> 3 llc:e c:o the parties. Van Tassell, by alleging insuffi-
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ciency of the evidence relating to attorney's fees did not 
preclude Broadwater from arguing the merits of this conte~-
tion nor preuent !:i.T. from "having hi." day .i.n court". The ls· 
sue was initially raised by the general allegation of · insuf-
ficiency of evidence and was specifically referred to int'.: 
reply brief. Broadwater was not in any way prejudiced by~:, 
failure to respond to this point in his respondent's brief. 
Van Tassell challenges Broadwater during this rehearir.: 
to produce any evidence in the record which would have char.:: 
the result of this Court's decision authored by Justice Cree· 
ett. Van Tassell vigorously contends that this Court did"': 
misconstrue or overlook any material fact or facts, base i:s 
decision on some wrong principle of law, or misapply or ove:· 
look something which would materially affect the results. ~ 
mings v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (1921). 
Broadwater was not denied due process of law during t:., 
appellate proceedings and was able to effectively present i:. 
argument in refutation to this Court upon oral argument . .,...: 
11 h . cases the failur: it is conceded by Van Tasse t at in many 
to adequately detail the error claimed may result in preju;:: 
to the opposing side this is surely not the case in an iss·;: 
simple as to whether there was evidence supporting the coo!: 
award of atto~ney's fees. 
It would be extremely unjust and inequ1~able 
-16-
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Ercadwater to escape his f ai 1 ure to prove at tor~ey' s fees 
:nerely because of alleged inartful pleading by Van Tassell 
.vher. ,-, 0 preJ c:c!ic2 is shown on the mere claim that Van Tassell 
dJ.d not clearly set forth his assignment of error. 
CONCLUSION 
Broadwater in his Petition for Rehearing urges this Court 
to reverse itself because of a failure of Broadwater to re-
ceive due process of law. Van Tassell submits that Broadwater 
was given due process of law in that a trial was held in which 
:ie obviously emerged the victor. For whatever reason, he failed 
to prove one element of his damages which was that of reason-
~le attorney's fees. He argues that Van Tassell should have 
warned him of this error and should have given him opportunity 
to correct his mistake. 
Van Tassell was not obligated to warn Broadwater of his 
error, was not obligated to object during the trial to this 
omission, and was not obligated to raise the insufficiency ques-
tion before the trial court since Rule 52 (b) specifically al-
lows ;o party discretion without penalty. Thus, Broadwater suf-
fAred n 1 -~ 0 oss of due process at the trial court level. 
Likewise, Broadwater was sufficiently apprised of Van Tas-
s~~l's clai'll ty his first assignmt:!nt of error in his main brief. 
- ''--~' ~f J. '.: .vere assumed that this statement was insufficient 
'ad 3uff1~ient opportunity to argue the existence of 
-17-
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any evidence at the oral argument, but could not do so becc.:, 
of its absence. Broadwater is now attempting to rely u~cr., 
~ . ! 
procedural rule of chis Court concerning i:Jr iei ing i:o elir:n·, .. l 
··~ .. i 
the substantial right of Van Tassell in claiming that the ::J 
! 
court committed error in granting a judgment where no evid;:::, 
was introduced to support it. 
I 
This Court was correct in its original deci<ion •rul °'''' 
its equitable power this Court can review any question inc:.~ 
appeal whether presented by the parties or not. A . I s sucn, t:.::I 
fore, the decision authored by Justice Crockett should be re·i 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CRAIG STEPHENS COOK 
Attorney for Van Tassell 
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